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Abstract—The Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) random key predistri-
bution scheme has been widely recognized as a typical approach
to secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
However, there is a lack of precise probability analysis on the
reliable connectivity of WSNs under the EG scheme. To address
this, we rigorously derive the asymptotically exact probability of
k-connectivity in WSNs employing the EG scheme with unreliable
links represented by independent on/off channels, where k-
connectivity ensures that the network remains connected despite
the failure of any (k− 1) sensors or links. Our analytical results
are confirmed via numerical experiments, and they provide precise
guidelines for the design of secure WSNs that exhibit a desired
level of reliability against node and link failures.
Index Terms—Connectivity, key predistribution, minimum de-
gree, random graphs, security, wireless sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) random key predistribution
scheme [4] has been widely regarded as a typical solution to
secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [12], [15]. The scheme operates as
follows. In a WSN with n sensors, before deployment, each
sensor is independently assigned Kn distinct keys which are
selected uniformly at random from a pool of Pn keys, where
Kn and Pn are both functions of n. After deployment, any two
sensors can securely communicate over an existing wireless link
if and only if they share at least one key.
Wireless links between nodes may become unavailable due
to the presence of physical barriers between nodes or because
of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing trans-
mission. We model unreliable links as independent channels,
each being on with probability pn or being off with probability
(1−pn), where pn is a function of n for generality. Such on/off
channel model has been used in the context of secure WSNs
[9], [15], [12], and is shown to well approximate the disk model
[5], [6], [9], [15], [12], where any two nodes need to be within
a certain distance to establish a wireless link in between.
Given the randomness involved in the EG key predistribution
scheme, and the unreliability of wireless links, there arises
a basic question as to how one can adjust the EG scheme
parameters Kn and Pn, and the link parameter pn, so that the
resulting network is securely and reliably connected. Reliability
against the failure of sensors or links is particularly important
in WSN applications where sensors are deployed in hostile
environments (e.g., battlefield surveillance), or, are unattended
for long periods of time (e.g., environmental monitoring), or,
are used in life-critical applications (e.g., patient monitoring).
To answer the question above, this paper presents the asymptot-
ically exact probability of k-connectivity in secure WSNs under
the EG scheme with unreliable links. A network (or a graph)
is said to be k-connected if it remains connected despite the
deletion of any (k−1) nodes or links. An equivalent definition
is that each node can find at least k internally node-disjoint
paths to any other node. With k = 1, k-connectivity simply
means connectivity.
Our result on the asymptotically exact probability of k-
connectivity complements a zero-one law established in our
prior work [15], [12], and is significant to obtain a precise
understanding of the connectivity behavior of secure WSNs.
First, with the zero-one law, one is only provided with design
choices which lead to networks that are k-connected with
high probability or to that are not k-connected with high
probability, where an event happens “with high probability”
if its probability asymptotically converges to 1. Given the
trade-offs involved between connectivity, security and memory
load [4], [9], it would be more useful to have a complete
picture by obtaining the asymptotically exact probability of k-
connectivity. In addition, there may be situations where the
network designer is interested in having a guaranteed level of
k-connectivity (one-laws would provide conditions for that) but
may also be interested in having some level of k-connectivity
without such guarantees (one-laws would fall short in providing
this). Our result fills this gap. Finally, it is not possible to
determine the width of the phase transition from zero-one laws;
the width of the phase transition is often calculated by the
difference in parameters that it takes to increase the probability
of k-connectivity from ǫ to (1 − ǫ), for some ǫ < 0.5. In
other words, it is not clear from zero-one laws how sensitive
the probability of k-connectivity is to the variations in the
EG scheme parameters Kn and Pn, and the link parameter
pn. By providing the asymptotically exact probability of k-
connectivity, our findings provide a clear picture of these
intricate relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
system model in Section II. Section III presents the main results
as Theorem 1, which is established in Section IV. In Section VI,
we present numerical experiments that confirm our analytical
findings. Afterwards, Section VII surveys related work, and
Section VIII concludes the paper. The Appendix presents a few
useful lemmas and their proofs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We now explain the system model. Consider a WSN with
n sensors operating under the EG scheme and with wireless
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links modeled by independent on/off channels. Let a node set
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} represent the n sensors. According to the
EG scheme, each node vi ∈ V is independently assigned a set
(denoted by Si) of Kn distinct cryptographic keys, which are
selected uniformly at random from a key pool of Pn keys. Any
pair of nodes can then secure an existing communication link
as long as they have at least one key in common.
The EG scheme results in a random key graph [1], [7], [10],
also known as a uniform random intersection graph. This graph
denoted by G(n,Kn, Pn) is defined on the node set V such that
any two distinct nodes vi and vj have an edge in between, an
event denoted by Γij , if and only if they share at least one key.
Thus, the event Γij means
(
Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅
)
.
Under the on/off channel model for unreliable links, each
wireless link is independently being on with probability pn or
being off with probability (1 − pn). Defining Cij as the event
that the channel between vi and vj is on, we have P [Cij ] = pn,
with P[A] throughout the paper meaning the probability that
event A happens. The on/off channel model induces an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graph G(n, pn) [2] defined on the node set V such that
vi and vj have an edge in between if Cij takes place.
Finally, we denote by G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) the underlying graph
of the n-node WSN under the EG scheme with unreliable links.
We often write G rather than G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) for brevity.
Graph G is defined on the node set V such that there exists
an edge between nodes vi and vj if events Γij and Cij happen
at the same time. We set event Eij := Γij ∩ Cij and also
write Eij as Evivj when necessary. It is clear that G is the
intersection of G(n,Kn, Pn) and G(n, pn); i.e.,
G = G(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, pn). (1)
We define sn as the probability that two distinct nodes share
at least one key and qn as the probability that two distinct nodes
have an edge in between in graph G. Clearly, sn and qn both
depend on Kn and Pn, while qn depends also on pn. As shown
in previous work [1], [7], [10], sn is determined through
sn = P[Γij ] =
{
1− (Pn−KnKn )/(PnKn), if Pn > 2Kn,
1, if Pn ≤ 2Kn.
Then by the independence of Cij and Γij , we have
qn = P[Eij ] = P[Cij ] · P[Γij ] = pn · sn (2)
=
{
pn ·
[
1− (Pn−KnKn )/(PnKn)], if Pn > 2Kn,
pn, if Pn ≤ 2Kn.
(3)
III. THE MAIN RESULTS
We present the main results below. Throughout the paper,
k is a positive integer and does not scale with n, and e is
the base of the natural logarithm function, ln. We use the
standard asymptotic notation o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·) and ∼;
in particular, for two positive sequences an and bn, the relation
an ∼ bn means limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
Theorem 1. For graph G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) under Pn = Ω(n)
and KnPn = o(1), with qn denoting the edge probability and a
sequence αn defined through
qn =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (4)
if limn→∞ αn = α∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), then as n→∞,
P [ Graph G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) is k-connected. ]→ e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! .
Theorem 1 provides the asymptotically exact probability
of k-connectivity in graph G. Its proof is given in the next
section. From (3), for all n sufficiently large, under Pn > 2Kn
which is clearly implied by the condition KnPn = o(1), the
edge probability qn in graph G is given by the expression
pn ·
[
1− (Pn−KnKn )/(PnKn)]. With a much simpler approximation
pn · Kn2Pn for qn, we present below a corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For graph G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) under Pn = Ω(n)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, with a sequence βn defined through
pn · Kn2Pn =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ βn
n
, (5)
if limn→∞ βn = β∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), then as n→∞,
P [ Graph G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) is k-connected. ]→ e−
e−β
∗
(k−1)! .
Setting pn = 1 in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain the
corresponding results for random key graph G(n,Kn, Pn) in
view of (1). Furthermore, we can use monotonicity arguments
[15] to derive the zero-one laws for k-connectivity in graph
G. Specifically, under the conditions of Theorem 1 (resp.,
Corollary 1), graph G is k-connected with high probability
if limn→∞αn = ∞ (resp., limn→∞βn = ∞), and is not k-
connected with high probability if limn→∞αn = −∞ (resp.,
limn→∞βn = −∞). The arguments are straightforward from
our work [15] and are omitted here due to space limitation.
Before establishing Corollary 1 using Theorem 1, we explain
the practicality of the conditions in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1:
Pn = Ω(n),
Kn
Pn
= o(1) and Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
. First, the condition
Pn = Ω(n) indicates that the key pool size Pn should grow
at least linearly with n, which holds in practice [4], [10], [9].
Second, the condtions KnPn = o(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
) (note
that the latter implies the former) are also practical in secure
sensor network applications since Pn is expected to be several
orders of magnitude larger than Kn [4], [10], [9].
We now prove Corollary 1 using Theorem 1. We have the
conditions of Corollary 1: Pn = Ω(n), Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, and
(5) with limn→∞ βn = β∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). First, it is clear that
βn = β
∗ ± o(1). Under Kn2Pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
= o(1), from [15,
Lemma 8], it holds that sn = Kn
2
Pn
· [1±O(Kn2Pn )]. In view of
the above, we obtain from (2) and (5) that
qn = pn · sn = pn · Kn2Pn ·
[
1±O(Kn2Pn )]
= lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+βnn ·
[
1± o( 1lnn)]
= lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+β
∗±o(1)
n . (6)
With αn defined by (4), we use (6) to derive αn = β∗ ± o(1),
which yields that α∗ denoting limn→∞ αn equals β∗. Then in
view of α∗ = β∗ and that the conditions of Theorem 1 all hold
given the conditions of Corollary 1 (note that Kn2Pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
implies KnPn = o(1)), Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1.
IV. ESTABLISHING THEOREM 1
For any graph, k-connectivity implies that its minimum
degree is at least k, while the other way does not hold
since a graph may have isolated components, each of which
is k-connected within itself. However, for random graph
G(n,Kn, Pn, pn), as given by Lemma 1 below, we have shown
it is unlikely under certain conditions that G(n,Kn, Pn, pn) is
not k-connected but has a minimum degree at least k.
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Lemma 1 ([15, Section IX]). For graph G(n,Kn, Pn, pn)
under Pn = Ω(n), KnPn = o(1) and qn = o(1), it holds that
P
[
Graph G is not k-connected,
but has a minimum degree at least k.
]
= o(1).
We show that the conditions in Lemma 1 all hold given the
conditions of Theorem 1: Pn = Ω(n), KnPn = o(1) and qn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n with limn→∞ αn = α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). To
see this, we only need to prove qn = o(1) needed in Lemma
1 follows from the conditions of Theorem 1. Clearly, it holds
that |αn| = O(1) from limn→∞ αn = α∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). Then
in view of |αn| = O(1) and the fact that k does not scale with
n, we obtain from (4) that
qn ∼ lnn
n
, (7)
which clearly implies qn = o(1).
From Lemma 1 and
P [ Graph G is k-connected. ]
= P [ Graph G has a minimum degree at least k. ]
− P
[
Graph G is not k-connected,
but has a minimum degree at least k.
]
,
Theorem 1 on k-connectivity of G will be proved once we
demonstrate Lemma 2 below on the minimum degree of G.
Lemma 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it holds that
limn→∞ P[G has a minimum degree at least k.] = e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! .
To prove Lemma 2, we first show that the number of nodes
in G with a certain degree converges in distribution to a Poisson
random variable. With φh denoting the number of nodes with
degree h in G, h = 0, 1, . . ., we use the method of moments
to prove that φh asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution
with mean λh. Specifically, from [11, Theorem 7], it follows
for any integers h ≥ 0 and ℓ ≥ 0 that
P[φh = ℓ] ∼ (ℓ!)−1λhℓe−λh , (8)
since P[Nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm all have degree h] ∼ λhm/nm,
which is shown by Lemma 3 below with
λh = n(h!)
−1(nqn)he−nqn . (9)
Lemma 3. For graph G under the conditions of Theorem 1,
P[v1,v2,. . . ,vm all have degree h] ∼ (h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn
holds for any integers m ≥ 1 and h ≥ 0.
As explained above, Lemma 3 shows (8) with λh given by
(9). Then the proof of Lemma 2 will be completed once we
establish Lemma 3 and the result that (8) implies Lemma 2.
Below we will demonstrate that (8) implies Lemma 2, and then
detail the proof of Lemma 3.
A. Proving that (8) implies Lemma 2
Recall that φh denotes the number of nodes with degree h in
graph G. With δ defined as the minimum degree of graph G,
then the event (δ ≥ k) is the same as ⋂k−1h=0(φh = 0) (i.e., the
event that no node has a degree falling in {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}).
Hence, we obtain
P[δ ≥ k] = P
[ k−1⋂
h=0
(φh = 0)
]
≤ P[φk−1 = 0]; (10)
and by the union bound, it holds that
P[δ ≥ k] = P
[
(φk−1 = 0)∩
( k−2⋃
h=0
(φh 6= 0)
) ]
≥ P[φk−1 = 0]−
k−2∑
h=0
P[φh 6= 0]. (11)
To use (10) and (11), we compute P[φh 6= 0] given (8) and thus
evaluate λh specified in (9). Applying (4) and (7) to (9), and
considering limn→∞ αn = α∗ with |α⋆| <∞, we establish
λh = n(h!)
−1(nqn)he−nqn
∼ n(h!)−1(lnn)h · e− lnn−(k−1) ln lnn−αn
= (h!)−1(lnn)h+1−ke−αn
→


0, for h = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2,
e−α
∗
(k−1)! , for h = k − 1,
∞, for h = k, k + 1, . . .
(12)
By (8) and (12), we derive that as n→∞,
P[φh = 0]→


1, for h = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2,
e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! , for h = k − 1,
0, for h = k, k + 1, . . .
(13)
Using (13) in (10) and (11), we obtain P[δ ≥ k]→ e− e
−α∗
(k−1)! ;
i.e., Lemma 2 is proved.
B. Proving Lemma 3
We use Vm to denote the node set {v1, v2, . . . , vm}. Lemma
3 evaluates the probability that each of Vm has degree h. To
compute such probability, we look at whether at least two of
Vm have an edge in between, and whether at least two of Vm
have at least one common neighbor. To this end, we define P1
as the probability of event
(each of Vm has degree h)
∩ [(at least two of Vm have an edge in between)
∪ (at least two of Vm have at least one common neighbor)
]
,
and define P2 as the probability of event
(each of Vm has degree h)
∩ (no two of Vm have any edge in between)
∩ (no two of Vm have any common neighbor).
Then P[each of Vm has degree h] = P1+P2. Thus, Lemma 3
will hold once we establish the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it holds
that P1 = o
(
(h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn
)
.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it holds
that P2 ∼ (h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn .
To prove Propositions 1 and 2, we analyze below how nodes
in graph G have edges. We first look at how edges exist
between v1, v2, . . . , vm. Recalling Cij as the event that the
communication channel between distinct nodes vi and vj is
on, we set 1[Cij ] as the indicator variable of event Cij by
1[Cij ] :=
{
1, if the channel between vi and vj is on,
0, if the channel between vi and vj is off .
We denote by Cm a
(
m
2
)
-tuple consisting of all possible 1[Cij ]
with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m as follows:
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Cm := (1[C12], , . . . ,1[C1m], 1[C23], , . . . ,1[C2m],
1[C34], . . . ,1[C3m], . . . , 1[C(m−1),m]).
Recalling Si as the key set on node vi, we define a m-tuple
Tm through Tm := (S1, S2, . . . , Sm). Then we define Lm
as Lm := (Cm, Tm). With Lm, we have the on/off states of
all channels between nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm and the key sets
S1, S2, . . . , Sm on these m nodes, so all edges between these
m nodes in graph G are determined. Let Cm,Tm and Lm be
the sets of all possible Cm, Tm and Lm, respectively.
Now we further introduce some notation to characterize how
nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm have edges with nodes of Vm, where Vm
denotes {vm+1, vm+2, . . . , vn}. Let Ni be the neighborhood set
of node vi, i.e., the set of nodes that have edges with vi. We
also define set Ni as the set {vm+1, vm+2, . . . , vn} \Ni. Then
we are ready to define sets Mj1j2...jm for all j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈
{0, 1} which characterize the relationships between sets Ni for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. We define
Mj1j2...jm :=
( ⋂
i∈{1,2,...,m}:ji=1
Ni
)
∩
( ⋂
i∈{1,2,...,m}:ji=0
Ni
)
.
(14)
In other words, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, if Ni is not empty, each
node in Ni belongs to Mj1j2...jm if ji = 1 and does not belong
to Mj1j2...jm if ji = 0. Also, if j1 = j2 = . . . = jm = 0, then
Mj1j2...jm =
⋂m
i=1Ni. The sets Mj1j2...jm for j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈
{0, 1} are mutually disjoint, and constitute a partition of the set
Vm (a partition is allowed to contain empty sets here). By the
definition of Mj1j2...jm for j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1}, we have∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
|M∗j1j2...jm | = |Vm| = n−m, (15)
and ∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|Mj1j2...jm | =
∣∣∣∣
( m⋃
i=1
Ni
)
∩ Vm
∣∣∣∣. (16)
We further define 2m-tuple Mm through1
Mm =
(|Mj1j2...jm | ∣∣ j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1})
=
(|M0m |, |M0m−1,1|, |M0m−21,0|, |M0m−21,1|, . . . ),
where |Mj1j2...jm | means the cardinality of Mj1j2...jm .
Under event E2, the set Mm is determined and we denote
its value by M(0)m , which satisfies

|M0i−1,1,0m−i | = h, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m;
|Mj1j2...jm | = 0, for
∑m
i=1 ji > 1;
|M0m | = n−m− hm.
(17)
To analyze event E2, we define L(0)m such that
(Lm ∈ L(0)m ) is
the event that no two of nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm have any common
neighbor. In view of events
(Lm ∈ L(0)m ), (Mm =M(0)m ) and
E2, then E2 is the same as
(Lm ∈ L(0)m ) ∩ (Mm =M(0)m ); i.e.,
E2 =
[(Lm ∈ L(0)m )∩ (Mm =M(0)m )]. (18)
We define Mm(Lm) for Lm ∈ Lm as the set of Mm under
which each of Vm has degree h. Thus, the event that each of
Vm has degree h is
(Lm ∈ Lm) ∩ (Mm ∈ Mm(Lm)), which
together with (18) yields
1For a non-negative integer x, the term 0x is short for 00 . . . 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“x” number of “0”
. Also,
for clarity, we add commas in the subscript of M0m−21,0 etc.
E1=
⋃
L∗m∈Lm,M∗m∈Mm(L∗m):
(L∗m /∈L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m )
P
[(Lm=L∗m)∩(Mm=M∗m)].
(19)
Now we prove Propositions 1 and 2 based on (18) and (19).
The inequality below following from (7) will be applied often:
qn ≤ 2 lnn
n
for all n sufficiently large. (20)
1) The Proof of Proposition 1
In view of (19) and considering the disjointness of events(Lm = L∗m) ∩ (Mm = M∗m) for L∗m ∈ Lm and M∗m ∈
Mm(L∗m), we express P[E1] as∑
L∗m∈Lm,M∗m∈Mm(L∗m):
(L∗m /∈L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m )
P
[(Lm=L∗m)∩(Mm=M∗m)] (21)
We evaluate (21) by computing
P
[(Mm =M∗m) | Lm = L∗m]. (22)
With C∗m and T ∗m defined such that L∗m = (C∗m, T ∗m), event
(Lm=L∗m) is the union of events (Cm= C∗m) and (Tm= T ∗m).
Since (Cm=C∗m) and (Mm=M∗m) are independent, we get
(22) = P
[(Mm =M∗m) | (Tm = T ∗m)].
For each j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1}, for any distinct nodes
w1, w2 ∈ Vm, events (w1 ∈ Mj1j2...jm) and (w2 ∈
Mj1j2...jm) are conditionally independent given (Tm =
T ∗m) , where T ∗m specifies the key sets S1, S2, . . . , Sm
as S∗1 , S
∗
2 , . . . , S
∗
m, respectively). Thus, with M∗m being(|M∗0m |, |M∗0m−1,1|, |M∗0m−21,0|, |M∗0m−21,1|, . . . ), we obtain
(22) = f(n−m,M∗m)P[w ∈M0m |Tm = T ∗m]|M
∗
0m |×∏
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
P[w ∈Mj1j2...jm |Tm = T ∗m]|M
∗
j1j2...jm
|,
(23)
where f(n − m,M∗m) is the number of ways assigning the
(n − m) nodes from Vm to Mj1j2...jm such that |Mj1j2...jm |
equals |M∗j1j2...jm |, for j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1}. Then
f(n−m,M∗m) =
(n−m)!∏
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}(|M∗j1j2...jm |!)
, (24)
which along with (15) yields
f(n−m,M∗m)≤ [(n−m)!]/(|M∗0m |!)
≤ n
∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|M∗j1j2...jm |
. (25)
For any j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1} with
∑m
i=1 ji ≥ 1, there
exists t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} such that jt = 1, so
P
[
w ∈Mj1j2...jm | Tm = T ∗m
]
≤ P[Ewvt | Tm = T ∗m] = P[Ewvt ] = qn, (26)
where Ewvt is the event that an edge exists between nodes
w and vt. Substituting (25) and (26) into (23), and denoting∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|M∗j1j2...jm | by Λ, we obtain
(22) < (nqn)
Λ×P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]|M
∗
0m |. (27)
To further evaluate (22) based on (27), we will prove below
that if
(L∗m /∈ L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m ), then
Λ ≤ hm− 1. (28)
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On the one hand, if L∗m /∈ L(0)m , there exist i1 and i2 with
1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ m such that nodes vi1 and vi2 are neighbors.
Hence, {vi1 , vi2} ⊆ [(
⋃m
i=1Ni)
⋂Vm] holds. Then from (16),
we have Λ =
∣∣⋃m
i=1Ni
∣∣− ∣∣(⋃mi=1Ni) ∩ Vm∣∣ ≤ hm− 2. On
the other hand, if M∗m 6= M(0)m , there exist i3 and i4 with
1 ≤ i3 < i4 ≤ m such that Ni3 ∩ Ni4 6= ∅. Then from (16),
Λ ≤ ∣∣⋃mi=1Ni∣∣ ≤ (∑mi=1 |Ni|)−|Ni3∩Ni4 | ≤ hm−1 follows.
Thus, we have proved (28), which along with (15) leads to
|M∗0m | = n−m− Λ > n−m− hm. (29)
From (7), it is true that nqn ∼ lnn, implying nqn > 1 for all
n sufficiently large. Then substituting (28) and (29) into (27),
we obtain that if
(L∗m /∈ L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m ), then for all
n sufficiently large, it holds that
(22) < (nqn)
hm−1×P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm. (30)
Applying (22) and (30) to (21),we get
(21)<
∑
L∗m∈Lm
{
|Mm(L∗m)|×P
[Lm=L∗m]×R.H.S. of (30)}.
(31)
To bound |Mm(L∗m)|, note that Mm is a 2m-
tuple. Among the 2m elements of the tuple, each of
|Mj1j2...jm |
∣∣
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
is at least 0 and at most h; and
the remaining element |M0m | can be determined by (15).
Then it’s straightforward that |Mm(L∗m)| ≤ (h + 1)2
m−1
.
Using this result in (31), and considering (Lm = L∗m) is the
union of independent events
(Tm = T ∗m) and (Cm= C∗m), and∑
C∗m∈CmP
[Cm= C∗m]=1, we derive
(21) < (h+ 1)2
m−1(nqn)hm−1×
∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P
[Tm = T ∗m]
× P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
}
. (32)
From (32) and nqn ∼ lnn → ∞ as n → ∞ by (7), the proof
of Proposition 1 is completed once we show∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
≤ e−mnqn · [1 + o(1)]. (33)
C. Establishing (33)
From (61) and (62) (Lemma 4 in the Appendix), we get
P[w ∈M∗0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
=P[w∈M∗0m |Tm=T ∗m]nP[w∈M∗0m |Tm=T ∗m]−m−hm
≤e−mnqn+m2nqn2+nqnpnKn
∑
1≤i<j≤m|S∗ij|(1−mqn)−m−hm (34)
for all n sufficiently large, where S∗ij := S∗i ∩S∗j . With (7) (i.e.,
qn ∼ lnnn ), we have m2nqn2 = o(1) and mqn = o(1), which
are substituted into (34) to induce (33) once we prove∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]e
nqnpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij | ≤ 1 + o(1). (35)
L.H.S. of (35) is denoted by Hn,m and evaluated below.
For each fixed and sufficiently large n, we consider: a)
pn < n
−δ(lnn)−1 and b) pn ≥ n−δ(lnn)−1, where δ is an
arbitrary constant with 0 < δ < 1.
a) pn < n−δ(lnn)−1
From pn < n−δ(lnn)−1, |S∗ij | ≤ Kn for 1 ≤ i < j ≤
m and (20), then for all n sufficiently large, it holds that
e
nqnpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij | < e2n
−δ·(m2 ) < em
2n−δ
, which is used in
Hn,m so that Hn,m<em
2n−δ
∑
T ∗m∈Tm P[Tm= T ∗m]=em
2n−δ
.
b) pn ≥ n−δ(lnn)−1
We relate Hn,m to Hn,m−1 and assess Hn,m iteratively.
First, with T ∗m = (S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗m), event (Tm = T ∗m) is
the intersection of independent events: (Tm−1 = T ∗m−1) and
(Sm = S
∗
m). Then we have
Hn,m=
∑
T ∗m−1∈Tm−1,
S∗m∈Sm
(
P[(Tm−1 = T ∗m−1)∩(Sm = S∗m)]×
e
nqnpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m−1 |S∗ij |e
nqnpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗im|
)
=Hn,m−1 ·
∑
S∗m∈Sm
P[Sm = S
∗
m]e
nqnpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗im|. (36)
By
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗im| ≤ m
∣∣S∗m ∩ (⋃m−1i=1 S∗i )∣∣ and (20), we have
e
nqnpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗im| ≤ e 2mpn lnnKn |S∗m∩(
⋃m−1
i=1 S
∗
i )|, which is used
in (36) to induce
Hn,m
Hn,m−1
≤
Kn∑
u=0
P
[∣∣∣∣S∗m∩
(m−1⋃
i=1
S∗i
)∣∣∣∣= u
]
e
2umpn lnn
Kn . (37)
Denoting
∣∣⋃m−1
i=1 S
∗
i
∣∣ by v, then for u satisfying 0 ≤ u ≤
|S∗m| = Kn and S∗m ∪
(⋃m−1
i=1 S
∗
i
)
= Kn + v − u ≤ Pn (i.e.,
for u ∈ [max{0,Kn + v − Pn},Kn]), we obtain
P
[∣∣∣∣S∗m∩
(m−1⋃
i=1
S∗i
)∣∣∣∣= u
]
=
(
v
u
)(
Pn − v
Kn − u
)/(
Pn
Kn
)
, (38)
which together with Kn ≤ v ≤ mKn yields
L.H.S. of (38) ≤ (mKn)
u
u!
· (Pn −Kn)
Kn−u
(Kn − u)! ·
Kn!
(Pn −Kn)Kn
≤ 1
u!
(
mKn
2
Pn −Kn
)u
. (39)
For u /∈ [max{0,Kn + v − Pn},Kn], L.H.S. of (38) equals 0.
Then from (37) and (39),
R.H.S. of (37) ≤
Kn∑
u=0
1
u!
(
mKn
2
Pn −Kn · e
2mpn lnn
Kn
)u
≤ e mKn
2
Pn−Kn
·e
2mpn lnn
Kn
. (40)
By [15, Fact 5] and 1−x ≤ e−x for any real x, it holds that
sn ≥ 1−
(
1−Kn/Pn
)Kn ≥ 1− e−Kn2/Pn , (41)
For n sufficiently large, from pn ≥ n−δ(lnn)−1 and (20) (i.e.,
qn = pnsn ≤ 2 lnnn ), we have
sn = pn
−1qn ≤ pn−1 · 2n−1 lnn ≤ 2nδ−1(lnn)2. (42)
Hence, for n sufficiently large, we apply (41) (42) and Pn >
2Kn (which holds from the condition KnPn = o(1)) to produce
Kn
2/(Pn −Kn) < 2Kn2/Pn ≤ −2 ln(1− sn)
≤ −2 ln(1− 2nδ−1(lnn)2) ≤ 2
√
2n
δ−1
2 lnn, (43)
where the last step uses − ln(1−y) ≤ √y for 0 < y < 1. From
(7) and condition Pn = Ω(n), we obtain from [15, Lemma 7]
that Kn = ω
(√
lnn
)
= ω(1). Then for an arbitrary constant
c > 2, it holds that Knpn ≥ Kn ≥ 4c·m(c−2)(1−δ) holds for all n
sufficiently large. Hence,
e
2mpn lnn
Kn ≤ e (c−2)(1−δ)2c lnn = n (c−2)(1−δ)2c . (44)
The use of (40) (43) and (44) in (37) yields
Hn,m/Hn,m−1 ≤ R.H.S. of (37)
≤ e2
√
2mn
δ−1
2 ·n
(c−2)(1−δ)
2c ·lnn ≤
(
e3n
δ−1
c lnn
)m
. (45)
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To derive Hn,m iteratively based on (45), we compute Hn,2
below. Setting m = 2 in L.H.S. of (35) and considering the
independence between (S1 = S∗1 ) and (S2 = S∗2), we gain
Hn,2=
∑
S∗1∈Sm
P[S1 = S
∗
1 ]
∑
S∗2∈Sm
P[S2 = S
∗
2 ]e
nqnpn
Kn
|S∗1∩S∗2 |. (46)
Clearly,
∑
S∗2∈SmP[S2 = S
∗
2 ]e
nqnpn
Kn
|S∗1∩S∗2 | equals R.H.S. of
(37) with m = 2. Then from (45) and (46),
Hn,2 ≤
∑
S∗1∈Sm
P[S1 = S
∗
1 ]e
6n
δ−1
c lnn = e6n
δ−1
c lnn. (47)
Therefore, it holds via (45) and (47) that
Hn,m≤
(
e3n
δ−1
c lnn
)m+(m−1)+...+3
e6n
δ−1
c lnn≤e3m2n
δ−1
c lnn.
Finally, from cases a) and b), for n sufficiently large, Hn,m
is at most max
{
em
2n−δ , e3m
2n
δ−1
c lnn
}
. Then (35) follows.
V. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We define C(0)m and T(0)m by C(0)m = ( 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m(m−1)/2 number of “0”
)
and T(0)m = {Tm | Si ∩ Sj = ∅, ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.}. Clearly,(Cm= C(0)m ) or (Tm ∈T(0)m ) each implies (Lm ∈L(0)m ). Also,(Cm= C(0)m ) and (Mm=M(0)m ) are independent of each other.
Thus, with P2 =P
[(Lm ∈ L(0)m )∩(Mm =M(0)m )], we derive
P2 ≥ P
[Cm = C(0)m ]P[Mm =M(0)m ], (48)
and
P2 ≥ P
[Tm ∈T(0)m ]P[(Mm=M(0)m )|(Tm ∈ T(0)m )]. (49)
Given that event
(Cm = C(0)m ) is ⋃1≤i<j≤m Cij and event(Tm ∈ T(0)m ) is ⋃1≤i<j≤m Γij , using the union bound, we get
P
[Cm = C(0)m ] ≥ 1− ∑
1≤i<j≤m
P[Cij ] ≥ 1−m2pn/2, (50)
and
P
[Tm ∈ T(0)m ] ≥ 1− ∑
1≤i<j≤m
P[Γij ] ≥ 1−m2sn/2. (51)
Denoting (h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn by Λ, we will prove
P
[Mm =M(0)m ] ∼ Λ, (52)
and
P
[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm ∈ T(0)m )] ≥ Λ · [1− o(1)]. (53)
Substituting (50) and (52) into (48), and applying (51) and (53)
to (49), we get (i) P2/Λ ≥ (1−min{sn, pn} ·m2/2)[1−o(1)].
From (52), we get (ii) P2 ≤ P
[Mm ∈ M(0)m ] ≤ Λ[1+o(1)].
Combining (i) and (ii) above and using min{sn, pn} ≤√
snpn =
√
qn = o(1) which holds from qn = snpn and
(7), Proposition 2 follows. Below we establish (52) and (53).
A. Establishing (52)
We write P
[Mm =M(0)m ] as∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P
[Tm=T ∗m]P[(Mm=M(0)m ) | (Tm=T ∗m)]},
where P
[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)] equals
f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
×
m∏
i=1
P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]h,
where f
(
n − m,M(0)m
)
is the number of ways assigning the
(n−m) nodes from Vm to Mj1j2...jm such that |Mj1j2...jm | is
given by M(0)m (see (17)). Hence, it holds from (24) that
f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
=
(n−m)!
(n−m−hm)!(h!)m∼(h!)
−mnhm. (54)
We will establish∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P[Tm= T ∗m]
m∏
i=1
{P[w∈M0i−1,1,0m−i |Tm=T ∗m]h}}
≥ qnhm · [1− o(1)]. (55)
We use (54) and (55) as well as (61) (viz., Lemma 4 in the
Appendix) in evaluating P[Mm =M(0)m ] above. Then
P
[Mm =M(0)m ]
≥ (h!)−mnhm · [1− o(1)] · (1−mqn)n×∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm= T ∗m]
m∏
i=1
{
P[w∈M0i−1,1,0m−i |Tm=T ∗m]h
}
≥ (h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn · [1− o(1)]. (56)
Substituting (33) (54) above and (63) in Lemma 4 into the
computation of P
[Mm =M(0)m ] yields
P
[Mm =M(0)m ]
≤ (h!)−mnhmqnhm × [1 + o(1)]×∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
∼ (h!)−m(nqn)hme−mnqn . (57)
Then (52) follows from (56) and (57). Namely, (52) holds
upon the establishment of (55). From (64) in Lemma 4 and
qn = o(1) by (7), we obtain (55) once proving
pn
Kn
∑
T ∗m∈Tm
(
P[Tm = T ∗m]
∑
1≤i<j≤m
|S∗ij |
)
= o(1). (58)
If T ∗m ∈ T(0)m , then |S∗ij | = 0. Then from (51), we get (58) by
L.H.S. of (58) ≤ pn ·m(m− 1)/2 ·P[T ∗m ∈ Tm \ T(0)m ]
≤ pn ·m2/2 ·m2sn/2 ≤ m4n−1 lnn/2 = o(1).
B. Establishing (53)
Let ∆ denote P
[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm ∈ T(0)m )]. Clearly,
∆ is equivalent to P
[(Mm = M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)] for any
T ∗m ∈ T(0)m , so it follows that
∆=f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
P[w ∈M0m |Tm= T ∗m]n−m−hm
×
m∏
i=1
{
P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]h
}
, (59)
with f
(
n − m,M(0)m
)
given by (54). For T ∗m ∈ T(0)m , from
|S∗ij | = 0 and (64) in Lemma 4, we derive
m∏
i=1
{
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm= T ∗m
]}h≥ qnhm(1−2hm2qn).
(60)
Substituting (54) (60) above and (61) in Lemma 4 into (59),
we conclude that ∆ is at least
(h!)−mnhm · [1− o(1)]
× qnhm(1− 2hm2qn) · (1−mqn)n−m−hm=Λ · [1−o(1)].
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
To confirm our analytical results, we now provide numerical
experiments in the non-asymptotic regime.
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Fig. 1. A plot generated from the simulation and the analysis for the
probability that G(n,K,P, p) is 2-connected versus K with n = 2, 000,
P = 10, 000 and p = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.
In Figure 1, we depict the probability that graph
G(n,K, P, p) is 2-connected from both the simulation and the
analysis, as elaborated below. In all set of experiments, we fix
the number of nodes at n = 2, 000 and the key pool size at
P = 10, 000. For the probability p of a communication channel
being on, we consider p = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, while varying the
parameter K from 3 to 21. For each pair (K, p), we generate
1, 000 independent samples of G(n,K, P, p) and count the
number of times that the obtained graphs are 2-connected. Then
the counts divided by 1, 000 become the empirical probabilities.
The curves in Figure 1 corresponding to the analysis are
determined as follows. We use the asymptotical result to
approximate the probability of 2-connectivity in G(n,K, P, p);
specifically, given n,K, P, p and k = 2, we determine α by
considering p · [1 − (P−KK )/(PK)] = lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn , a
condition stemming from (4) and the computation of qn in
Section II, and then use e−
e−α
(k−1)! as the analytical reference
of P[G(n,K, P, p) is 2-connected] for a comparison with the
empirical probabilities. Figure 1 indicates that the experimental
results are in agreement with our analysis.
VII. RELATED WORK
Random key graphs. For a random key graph G(n,Kn, Pn)
(viz., Section II) which models the topology induced by the
EG scheme, Rybarczyk [7] derives the asymptotically exact
probability of connectivity, covering a weaker form of the result
– a zero-one law which is also obtained in [1], [10]. Rybarczyk
[8] further establishes a zero-one law for k-connectivity, and
we [14] obtain the asymptotically exact probability of k-
connectivity. Under Pn = Θ(nc) for some constant c > 1 and
Kn
2
Pn
= lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αnn , Rybarczyk’s result [8] is that the
probability of k-connectivity in graph G(n,Kn, Pn) is asymp-
totically converges to 1 (resp. 0) if limn→∞ αn equals∞ (resp.,
−∞), while we [14] prove that such probability asymptotically
approaches to e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! if limn→∞ αn = α∗ ∈ (−∞,∞).
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs. For an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, pn)
where any two nodes have an edge in between independently
with probability pn, Erdo˝s and Re´nyi consider connectivity in
[2] and k-connectivity in [3], where the latter result is that if
pn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n and limn→∞ αn = α
∗ ∈ [−∞,∞],
graph G(n, pn) is k-connected with a probability asymptoti-
cally tending to e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)!
.
Random key graphs ∩ Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs. As given
in Section II, our studied graph G is the intersection of a
random key graph G(n,Kn, Pn) and an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph
G(n, pn). For graph G, Yag˘an [9] establishes a zero-one law
for connectivity, and we [15], [12] extend Yag˘an’s result to
k-connectivity and show that with Pn = Ω(n), KnPn = o(1)
and qn set as lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αnn , graph G is (resp., is not) k-
connected with high probability if limn→∞ αn = ∞ (resp.,
limn→∞ αn = −∞). Compared with this result in [15],
[12], our result on the asymptotically exact probability of k-
connectivity is stronger and more challenging to derive.
Random key graphs ∩ random geometric graphs. Con-
nectivity properties have also been studied in secure sensor
networks employing the EG scheme under the disk model,
where any two nodes need to be within a certain distance
rn to have a link in between. When nodes are assumed
to be uniformly and independently deployed in some region
A, the topology of such a network is represented by the
intersection of a random key graph G(n,Kn, Pn) and a random
geometric graph, where a random geometric graph denoted by
G(n, rn,A) is defined on n nodes independently and uniformly
distributed in A such that an edge exists between two nodes
if and only if their distance is at most rn. Krzywdzin´ski
and Rybarczyk [6], Krishnan et al. [5], and we [13] present
connectivity results in graph G(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, rn,A). With
the network region A being a square of unit area, Krzywdzin´ski
and Rybarczyk [6] show that G(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, rn,A) is
connected with high probability if πrn2 · Kn2Pn ∼ c lnnn for any
constant c > 8. Krishnan et al. [5] improves the condition on
c to c > 2π. Later we [13] derive the critical value c∗ of c as
max{1+ limn→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
, 4 limn→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)};
namely, graph G(n,Kn, Pn)∩G(n, rn,A) is (resp., is not)
connected with high probability for any constant c > c∗ (resp.,
c < c∗). There has not been any analogous result for k-
connectivity reported in the literature.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we consider secure WSNs under the
Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) key predistribution scheme with unre-
liable links and obtain the asymptotically exact probability of
k-connectivity. A future direction is to consider k-connectivity
in WSNs employing the EG scheme under the disk model [9],
[5] in which two nodes have to be within a certain distance for
communication in addition to sharing at least one key.
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APPENDIX
A. Useful Lemmas
We present below Lemmas 4 and 5, which are proved in the
next subsections. Lemma 4 is used in establishing Propositions
1 and 2 in Section IV-B. The condition Pn ≥ 3Kn in Lemma
4 follows for all n sufficiently large given Kn/Pn = o(1) in
Propositions 1 and 2. Lemma 5 is used in proving Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Given Pn ≥ 3Kn and any T ∗m = (S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗m),
with S∗ij denoting S∗i ∩S∗j , for any node w ∈ Vm, we obtain
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m] ≥ 1−mqn, and (61)
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]
≤ e−mqn+m2qn2+Kn−1qnpn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij|; (62)
and for any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we have
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
] ≤ qn, and (63)∏m
i=1
{
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]}h
≥ qnhm
(
1− 2hm2qn − 2hpnKn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij |
)
. (64)
Lemma 5. With Γij denoting the event that an edge ex-
ists between distinct nodes vi and vj in random key graph
G(n,Kn, Pn), if Pn ≥ 3Kn, then for three distinct nodes vi, vj
and vt, we have P[(Γit∩Γjt | (|Sij | = u)] ≤ Kn−1snu+2sn2
for u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn.
B. The Proof of Lemma 4
For any node w ∈ Vm, event (w ∈M0m) equals
⋃m
i=1 Ewvi ,
where Ewvi is the event that there exists an edge between nodes
w and vi in G. By a union bound, L.H.S. of (61) is at least
1−∑mi=1 P[Ewvi | Tm = T ∗m] = 1−mqn so that (61) is proved.
And to prove (62), by the inclusion–exclusion principle, we get
P[w∈M0m |Tm=T ∗m]≤ 1−
m∑
i=1
P[Ewvi |Tm=T ∗m]
+
∑
1≤i<j≤m
P[Ewvi∩Ewvj |Tm=T ∗m].
Then we use Lemma 5 to further derive
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]
≤ 1−mqn + pn2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
(
Kn
−1sn|S∗ij |+ 2sn2
)
≤ e−mqn+m2qn2+Kn−1qnpn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij |,
where the last step uses 1 + x ≤ ex for any real x.
For any node w ∈ Vm, event w ∈ M0i−1,1,0m−i means that
node w has an edge with node vi, but has no edge with any
node in Vm \ {vi} = {vj | j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ {i}}. Then
(63) follows since P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m] is at most
P[Ewvi | Tm = T ∗m] = P[Ewvi ] = qn. where the last step uses
the independence between event Ewvi and event (Tm = T ∗m).
We now demonstrate (64). From the above, we have
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]
=P[Ewvi ∩
(⋂
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
| Tm = T ∗m]
=P[Ewvi ]−P[Ewvi∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
|Tm=T ∗m], (65)
where the last step uses P[Ewvi | Tm = T ∗m] = P[Ewvi ] since
event Ewvi is independent of event (Tm = T ∗m).
From (65) and P[Ewvi ] = qn, we obtain
qn
−1
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]
=1−qn−1P[Ewvi ∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
| Tm= T ∗m],
so that
qn
−hm ·∏mi=1 {P[w ∈M (0)0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]}h
=
m∏
i=1
{
1−qn−1P[Ewvi∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
|Tm=T ∗m]
}h
≥1−h
m∑
i=1
{
qn
−1
P[Ewvi∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
|Tm=T ∗m]
}
,
(66)
where the last step uses the following inequality easily proved
by mathematical induction:
∏r
ℓ=1(1 − xℓ) ≥ 1 −
∑r
ℓ=1 xℓ for
any positive integer r and any xℓ with 0 ≤ xℓ ≤ 1 for ℓ =
1, 2, . . . , r (we set r = mh, with the mh number of xl as m
groups, where the group i for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m has m members
all being qn−1P[Ewvi∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
|Tm=T ∗m].)
To analyze (66), we use the union bound and Lemma 5 to get
P[Ewvi ∩
(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}Ewvj
)
| Tm = T ∗m]
≤∑j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i} P[Ewvi ∩ Ewvj | Tm = T ∗m]
≤∑j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i} pn2(Kn−1sn|S∗ij |+ 2sn2)
≤ 2mqn2 +Kn−1pnqn
∑
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i} |S∗ij |,
which is substituted into (66) to establish (64) by
qn
−hm ·∏mi=1 {P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]}h
≥ 1− h∑mi=1 {2mqn +Kn−1pn∑j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i} |S∗ij |}
≥ 1− 2hm2qn − 2hpnKn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S∗ij |. (67)
C. The Proof of Lemma 5
We use the inclusion–exclusion principle to obtain
P[Γit∩Γjt | (|Sij | = u)]
= P[Γit | (|Sij | = u)] + P[Γjt | (|Sij | = u)]
− P[Γit∪Γjt | (|Sij | = u)]
= 2sn − 1 +
(
Pn−(2Kn−u)
Kn
)/(
Pn
Kn
)
, (68)
in view that event (|Sij | = u) is independent of each of Γit
and Γjt, and event Γit ∪Γjt means St ∩ (Si ∪Sj) 6= ∅.
By [9, Lemma 5.1] and [15, Fact 2], we derive
(1− sn)
2Kn−u
Kn ≤ 1− sn(2Kn−u)Kn + 12
( sn(2Kn−u)
Kn
)2
≤ 1− 2sn +Kn−1snu+ 2sn2,
which is substituted into (68) to complete the proof.
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